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Is the rapid growth of China’s emerging industries driven by industrial subsidies?: People’s Daily_我的网站

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Workers assemble solar photovoltaic modules at a smart manufacturing workshop of Ronma Solar Energy Group in Jindong district of Jinhua city, East China's Zhejiang Province, on July 28, 2026. Photo: VCG
China saw robust exports in electric vehicles (EV), lithium batteries and photovoltaic products, known as the "new three," in the first half of this year. More notably, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI) and innovative drugs, which represent the future direction of industrial development, are also emerging as new calling cards for China's foreign trade.
However, the impressive performance provoked unease among some Western media outlets and politicians. Some have deliberately portrayed China's rapid industrial development and strong competitiveness as a result of government subsidies, pushing the false claim that subsidies have created overcapacity and those low-priced Chinese products are flooding global markets. Such fallacies, which simply equate industrial subsidies with overcapacity, are not only logically flawed but also factually groundless.
In practice, many countries adopt industrial policies tailored to their national conditions and development needs, such as providing research and development (R&D) subsidies for emerging industries and risk related subsidies for agriculture.
Well-designed industrial subsidies can help address market failures, promote technological innovation and environmental protection, reduce poverty and support balanced development, rather than cause so called "overcapacity."
Multiple reports by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have noted that the number of industrial policies worldwide has grown rapidly over the past five years, with R&D subsidies, tax incentives and low interest loans for emerging industries becoming common international practices.
Forcibly linking industrial subsidies to "overcapacity" is, in essence, a political manipulation based on double standards. The US, for example, plans to provide $750 billion in various subsidies from 2022 to 2031 under its Inflation Reduction Act. Subsidized EVs are subject to requirements such as production and sales in the US or North America, effectively excluding other WTO members. US industrial subsidies for AI are even greater than those of all other countries combined.
Similarly, according to incomplete statistics, the European Commission is expected to provide more than 1.44 trillion euros ($210 billion) in various subsidies between 2021 and 2030. The EU's Industrial Accelerator Act links local content directly to financial support through "Made in EU" requirements, creating serious investment barriers and institutional discrimination.
Have these massive subsidies been labeled as causing "overcapacity"? The answer is no. While claiming that China's industrial subsidies lead to so-called overcapacity, these countries are themselves providing massive subsidies to their own industries. Such double standards amount to selective accusations targeting China, aimed at politicizing trade and economic issues and weaponizing industrial policy.
At a deeper level, accusations that "China's industrial subsidies cause overcapacity" are merely a pretext, reflecting growing anxiety and fear over the rising competitiveness of Chinese industries.
Looking back at the repeated hype in Western media, the criticism has consistently targeted China's most globally competitive industries, including new-energy vehicles, photovoltaics and power batteries. This exposes the real intention of shifting the blame for their own lagging industrial development onto China while stepping up restrictions against Chinese industries.
China's breakthroughs in these industries have been driven by advances in homegrown technologies, complete industrial and supply chains, and robust market competition, rather than by policy subsidies as some have claimed.
In recent years, China has taken multiple steps to regulate and improve its subsidy policies, from reviewing and correcting inappropriate local subsidies to exploring a unified negative list mechanism for local fiscal subsidies. China applies subsidies equally to all market entities, including foreign invested enterprises, strictly follows WTO rules, and continues to improve the compliance, effectiveness and transparency of its subsidy policies.
Rather than fabricating and hyping baseless claims about subsidies and obsessing over building trade barriers, certain Western media outlets and politicians should focus on addressing their own weaknesses and increasing investment in research and development. They should embrace healthy market competition with an inclusive mindset, promote mutual benefit through greater openness, and win markets and drive progress through genuine innovation.
This was compiled and translated by the Global Times English edition based on an article published in the "Chisu Jinsheng" economic commentary column of the People's Daily on August 10, 2026.
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　阿里云优惠券先领券再下单拼多多直通车大家应该都会开吧，目前拼多多直通车就2个推广模块：一个是稳定成本推广，还有一个全店托管。出价这块更简单了，也是就2个，按成交出价或者按投产比出价。

二 | 而全店托管就一个按投产比出价。

三 | 关于拼多多直通车这块，这2句话就讲完了，是不是很简单，我相信大家应该是有手就能开吧？什么？还是不会？我做拼多多店铺代运营，接触了很多甲方商家，也陪跑过一些做拼多多的商家。我就发现大家做拼多多，关于直通车这块基本上都存在着2个共性问题：要么没单，要么有单没利润。拼多多直通车操作如此简单了，为啥大家还没单或者没利润呢？我觉得吧，从基础功能上来讲，拼多多直通车相对某宝确实简单很多，但是从对工具的理解程度上来看，天底下的直通车都一样难开。比如拼多多直通车别人能开出10的投产比，咱们开3都没单，怎么回事呢？我起的一个链接比别人卖价贵10块，直通车出价比别人低，别人都没我单量多，这又是什么原因呢？今天就简单跟大家聊聊，关于提高拼多多直通车投产比的话题。 01 提高投产比最常规做法：拖价拖价是什么意思，不需要我再解释了吧。不懂的，可以去搜一下。如果各位连拖价是什么都不知道，那么直通车提高投产比还有很长的路要走的。我代运营接的店铺里，基本上99%的甲方诉求都是盈利，那么店铺一上来就能盈利吗？不是没可能，是可能性很低。2~3%的店铺我可以直接带利润起店。这种非常规盈利起店模型就不讲了，不适合大家，听了也没啥用，咱来讲讲那98%的需要前期车损后期才能盈利的店铺。单一个拖字，大家应该就知道，拖价绝不是一朝一夕可以完成的工作。我遇到过一个甲方，当月车损，当月就要回本，要知道那个店第一个月车损1千，销售额做到8W，正常拖价的话，次月就可以打正了。可惜认知决定命运，甲方愣是觉得第一个月没有回本，不想做了。

四 | 再看看我接的其他店，大部分都是前两个月冲销量，第三个月开始拖价，做到盈亏平衡，第四个月之后开始打正。这里大家应该就懂了，拼多多直通车拖价的核心思路是前期在车损可接受范围内，尽量的把单量拉到最高。比如单月1万车损和10万车损的预算，两者玩法是不一样的。以我接触的那些甲方来看，大家不会有很高的车损预算，单月车损3~5K是大多商家能接受的范围。

五 | 那么，我们在前期车损拉单量（权重）时，可以算算一笔账，比如车损预算3K，成本10，卖价15，车费7，每单亏3，车损3K，就是1千单，按照30天来分布，车损情况下，每天订单量可以控制在30单左右。这是理想的状态，实际在开车过程中，有的时候链接会直接爆单，今天30单，明天冲到100单，然后我会根据甲方可以接受的车损预算直接来进行拖价了。

六 | 大家没有看错，不一定非要车损一个月后拖价，什么时候拖价，拖多少，完全根据车损预算来的。如果甲方不差钱，爆单了，我也不会去拖价干预单量，能爆多少爆多少，当单量不增长时拖价，效果才是最好的。大家明白了吗，拖价最核心的2个点，什么时候拖价，拖多少。第一个问题应该有答案了吧，啥时候拖价是看老板有多少预算来亏。第二个问题，拖多少，这个没有标准的，网上说的上下浮动不超过出价的5%，这是谨慎的做法，如果链接起势很猛，就算投产比翻倍去拖，单量也不会掉多少，拖价多少是根据这个链接跑的好与坏来判断的。 02 提高投产比非常规做法：切车上面的玩法偏理论，大家需要时间来掌握，不一定能立刻学会。能立刻学会的就是接下来要讲的切车提高投产比的方法。最上面说的拼多多目前有2个推广工具：稳定成本和全店托管。就这2个工具互相切是可以实现提高投产比目的的。具体怎么操作的呢？以我接的某3C品为例，这个品成本40，卖价69，保本投产比在2.5左右。起店时基本上是贴着保本投产比跑的，净投产跑下来在2点三四左右，按照常规做法那就是拖价嘛，用3个月时间，把投产比从2.3拖到3.0，问题不大。

七 | 不过，这个甲方催的紧，如果按3个月周期来拖价，时间耗不起，那怎么办？切车嘛。前面投产比是稳定成本跑的，提投产比时，我就把全店托管打开了，开5的投产比，打开极速起量。关于全店托管有个小知识点，新链接直接开全店托管跑不动，但是稳定成本里面跑的有单的链接，切到全店托管，可以直接起飞。在稳定成本里面跑出2.3投产比的链接，切到全店托管5的投产比，跑完20单之后，没有断流，后面出的单投产比在4.0左右了。我一看，这个思路可行，就继续上新链接先低投产比跑稳定，有单之后就切到全店托管跑高投产，就这样操作，店铺整体的投产比就被提起来了。实操中，不是每个稳定成本切到全店托管的链接都能跑的动，在全店托管跑完一阶段就断流的链接，继续切回稳定成本，按照常规的拖价思路来提高投产比了。拼多多直通车满满的都是细节，简约不简单。

八 | 03 提高投产比立竿见影的做法：提高转化率投产比和转化率是相辅相成的，为什么大家拖价时，链接崩了，是因为链接转化率不够高。像我接的水果类目，真全网最低价，我投产比拖价从5拖到10都不心慌的，本来都能玩自然单的链接，我给平台10%的车费都不算低了，怎么可能会崩呢？所以，问题就回到了如何提高转化率上来了。咋提高转化率呢？这里简单说一些方法：有资源的话，就去搞黑标，转化率相对白牌会高一些；链接价格没优势，就去报大促，拿个大促横幅，转化也会提高一点点；还有主图和SKU布局，参考榜单链接来做，更符合买家的购买习惯，转化率也能提高一点点；还有优惠券，能设置的就安排上，有总比没有的好；还有其他很多很多小技巧，大家自己琢磨咯，反正只要链接转化上去了，你的投产比自然而然就能上去，这是如真理一般的真理。 04 最后拼多多起量其实不难，难的是起量同时直通车花费如何降低。如果只看直通车，大家只能头疼医头，脚痛医脚，提高投产比要全方位来操作，这样说吧，你让采购去跟上游吃个饭，成本降2元，你的保本投产比是不是也降低了。

九 | 站在全局的角度，优化能优化的每一个环节，比如主图、评价，过段时间你就会发现，即使不拖价，直通车实际跑下来的净投产竟然比之前高了。作者：老虎讲运营，运营书籍《全栈运营高手》作者；8年电商运营经验，千万流水项目操盘手，多平台专栏作家，专注产品运营与推广，擅长品牌打造和爆款链接制造，号称电商运营界扛把子。

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